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Abstract This paper focuses on the economic and not on the political im-
pact of corruption. Corruption delegitimizes the working of a market econ-
omy, as well as the outcomes of political processes. This paper highlights 
ways in which corruption, by distorting economic decisions and the working 
of the market economy, inevitably reduces a country’s rate of growth. The 
paper also discusses some of the channels through which corruption distorts 
various economic decisions. Finally, the paper reports on some actions that 
have been taken by countries in their attempt to reduce corruption stressing 
that the fight against corruption cannot rely on a magic bullet but has to be 
fought on many fronts.
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I. Historical background
The Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary of the English language 
explains that the root of the word corruption comes from the Latin 
word rumpere that means to break. It implies that something is bro-
ken, normally, in the case of acts of corruption, a code of conduct or a 
behavior considered by the relevant community as correct and proper. 
The connection with a Latin word is appropriate because, according to 
some students of corruption, it was in the Roman Empire that corrup-
ƤǡƤǡ-
priate behavior; and it was the Roman Empire that, some historians ar-
gue, disintegrated because of the corrosive impact that corruption had 
on its institutions and on its leaders. Corruption weakened or destroyed 
the moral fabric and the administrative structure of that powerful em-
pire, eventually leading to its collapse.
There have been frequent mentions of corruption through history. A very 
early and often- mentioned one is in the writings of Kautilya, the prime 
minister of an Indian Kingdom. Two thousands years ago, in a book called 
Arthashastra, Kautilya wrote that “as it is impossible not to taste honey 
placed on one’s tongue, so it is impossible for a civil servant not to take 
advantage of his position.” In the millennium after the fall of the  Roman 
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Empire, corruption came to be seen as a major sin. For example, the Ko-
ran makes several references to it. Dante, the great 13th
 
century Italian 
poet, author of The Divine Comedy, placed corrupt people in the deepest 
levels of Hell. The strictly negative view of corruption continued to pre-
vail through the centuries, until relatively modern times. The American 
Constitution, for example, explicitly mentions two crimes that can jus-
tify the impeachment of a president. These are: treason and bribery (See 
Noonan Jr. 1984).
In the 19th
 
century, attitudes toward corruption became somewhat more 
relaxed and seemingly more tolerant. There are increasing references to 
it in literary works and even in some operas. Though these references do 
not condone corruption, they do not seem to carry the strong moral con-
demnation that had characterized the attitudes in earlier centuries. For 
example, there are references to it in books such as Henry Adams’ novel, 
Democracy, and in Puccini’s opera, Manon Lescaux. Corruption became 
almost a natural or even expected characteristic of behavior in the new 
bourgeois society that accompanied the Industrial Revolution when the 
role of the state in economic activities had started to grow. This more 
relaxed attitude continued in the 20th
 
century, when, at least in some 
countries, corruption became prevalent and began to create serious dif-
ƤǤ levels during the Brezhnev era in the Soviet 
Union, when even gaining access to a morgue for a dead body required 
the payment of a bribe, and visitors to Brezhnev were expected to bring 
expensive gifts (see Remnick 1994). Until the 1990s there were relatively 
few writings on corruption and they were predominantly written by po-
litical scientists, rather than by economists. Few economists had paid 
ǡƤǣǦȋǦ
Ackerman 1978) and Robert Klitgaard (Klitgaard 1988).
In the 1990s, and especially in the second half of that decade, corrup-
tion suddenly became a hot topic, both academically and politically. 
Several reasons can be mentioned for the increased attention paid to 
corruption (see Tanzi 1998), including: (a) the end of the Cold War; 
(b) the spread of democratic regimes and the increasing role of the 
(free) media; (c) increasing globalization and the international con-
       ơ Ǣ
(d) the growing role of non-governmental organizations and of “civil 
society;” (e) the increasing attention paid by international institutions 
and some governments to corruption; and (f) growing concern about 
ƥ
KORUPCIJA: KORENI, MEHANIZMI, ISKORENJIVANJE
35
 generate for market economies. In a globalized world, where the econo-
ơǡ-
Ƥ
in the economies that were closed and not market oriented. Finally, ma-
jor political scandals connected with acts of corruption, in Japan, Italy, 
France, Germany, Brazil and some other countries, made corruption a 
front page story in major newspapers.
Another factor that may have contributed to both corruption and to the 
awareness of it, especially over the later decades of the 20th century, 
was the progressively larger economic roles that governments were as-
suming, compared with earlier periods. This larger role was played by 
governments through the use of various instruments, including public 
ǡǡǡƤ-
rizations, and through the assumption of contingent liabilities. Each of 
these instruments could lend itself to abuses, either by the policymak-
ers themselves, (the “principal”), or by the public bureaucracies, (the 
“agents”). Some governmental activities carried with them the implicit 
creation of monopolistic power for the individuals who were charged 
with carrying out these activities or monitoring them. When this pub-
lic power given to government employees is accompanied by some pow-
er of discretion, over particular decisions, unscrupulous employees are 
Ƥ
in other ways.
Attempts to scale down the government role in some countries, through 
policies of privatization and outsourcing, may also have contributed to 
corruption or, at least, to the perception of corruption. This happened, 
for example, in Latin America where, following the guidelines of the 
so-called “Washington Consensus,” many public enterprises were priva-
tized in the decade of the 1990s. The popular reaction to this privatiza-
tion was generally negative in part because it led to higher prices (but 
often for higher quality services), and because of widespread percep-
tion that the policymakers, who were charged with pursuing the poli-
cies of privatization, got bribes in the process. When a public enter-
prise is privatized, there is no reference or available market price that 
can indicate the compensation that the government should receive for 
selling the enterprise. This is especially true when the buyers are ex-
pected to assume some of the enterprises’ liabilities, such as the pen-
sion obligations for retired workers, or the retention of unproductive 
workers. Thus, there is often no way of refuting accusations that the 
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 enterprises have been sold at too low a price because of bribes paid to 
some individuals.
II. Difficulties in Defining Corruption
Corruption comes in many shapes and forms (see Tanzi 1995). Like 
ǡ ƥƤǡ 
recognize acts of corruption when they occur. Unfortunately, this is not 
ǡ ơ -
ơ -
ferently. In the 1990s several international organizations started to dis-
ǡƤ
ƤǤ
Countries’ representatives and experts from international organizations 
  ơ  Ƥ
would be precise and especially universally accepted. It did not prove to 
be an easy enterprise, because there are forms of corruption that are dif-
Ƥ
by exponents of particular cultures. Cultural backgrounds often play a 
large role in these attitudes, especially in actions that involve exchanges 
of gifts or favors, or the treatment of particular individuals.
 Ƥ        
absence of equal and fair treatment for all individuals on the part of 
ƥǡƤơ-
ated treatment, as for example for disabled individuals. This equality of 
ǡǡƤ
“arm’s length principle.” The arm’s length principle requires that eco-
nomic relationships must be characterized by the same objective treat-
ment for everyone, regardless of whether the persons involved are per-
fect strangers, friends, family, party members, members of the same 
ǡǤƥ
these characteristics into consideration in dealings with citizens. When 
ƥǦƥ
with some citizens, he is abandoning the arm’s length principle and he 
may be engaging in acts of corruption.
ǯƪ-
tions and norms of old cultures, in which one is expected to treat par-
ticular individuals, and especially family members and members of the 
ǡơǤƪǡ
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that are often impersonal and imported from other countries, such as 
the arm’s length principle, and traditional and deep-seated rules, is of-
ơ
Ǥƥǡǡ
to stamp out all forms of corruption. In some countries gifts are com-
mon and expected. They often become hidden bribes.
 ơ  
ǤƤ
forms is useful in identifying the areas that need particular attention 
and protection from acts of corruption. A full discussion of these forms 
ǤǡƤ
may be useful.
  ƪ ǲ
ƥ
ƤǤǳƤƤ
to two adjectives, namely public and personal. Before going on to the 
Ƥǡ 
ƪǤ
The phenomenon of corruption is often associated with the activities of 
ƥǡ
government. However, modern economies have large private establish-
ments and, especially, business corporations that are owned by thou-
sands of shareholders who own shares (and thus own a piece of the cor-
porations) but play no role in running the enterprises. To some extent 
Ƥ-
Ƥvis á vis the state. These corporations are normally 
run by hired professional managers and employ workers that are unre-
lated to the owners of the enterprises. Thus, the employees of the enter-
ǡǡƤ
those of government ministers and public employees. They often have 
the same capacity or the same space to abuse their public power (within 
the corporations) for strictly personal advantages, against the interests 
of the (distant) owners of the enterprises (the shareholders); or occa-
sionally against the interests of the public or some other groups, as, for 
example, those who have accumulated private pension rights against 
the corporations. This, for example, happened in Enron, the large 
American corporation that went bankrupt in 2001, and has happened 
in several other enterprises. Corporate scandals have become frequent 
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in recent years, because the market economy has been creating “public” 
spaces within enterprises where acts of corruption have become pos-
sible. Therefore, the spotlight for identifying corruption should not 
be limited to the government activities and to the public employees, 
ǤƤ-
nancial market, the health sector, and professional sports have become 
clearly part of these sensitive areas. Major acts of corruption have been 
frequently reported in these sectors of the (private) market.
Moving to the other adjective (“personal”) it may be too restrictive to as-
Ƥ
the individuals who engage in them. Often these acts have the objective 
of helping relatives, members of the same religious or ethnic group, or 
ǤǡƤ
the individual receives may be linked only indirectly to the acts of cor-
ruption. Surveys conducted over the years by the Gallup Organization 
(for Transparency International, the leading non-governmental orga-
nization that reports on corruption) indicate that political corruption 
(i.e., corruption to promote political parties) is very common around 
the world.
The above discussion suggests that we could distinguish between pub-
lic sector corruption and private sector corruption. As mentioned, over 
the years the attention has been mostly directed toward public sector 
corruption. However, in more recent years, and especially in the United 
States and in some other industrial countries, corrupt activities in dif-
ferent parts of the private sector have become more frequent and have 
started attracting some attention. 
Private sector corruption may in turn be divided into two distinct parts: 
ǡƤ-
gal corruption. Legal corruption may sound like a misnomer. It refers to 
private activities that may not break existing laws or rules but that, in 
ǡơ-
tion. Take, for example, tax accountants that help taxpayers avoid pay-
ing taxes by looking for ambiguities in the tax laws and exploiting them 
to the fullest, to the taxpayer’s advantage. Another example may be that 
of heads of corporations (CEOs) that appoint individuals to the corpo-
rate boards knowing that they are likely to authorize very generous, and 
often nontransparent, and complex compensation packages for the cor-
porate heads. Or, take for instance, individuals who lobby politicians 
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and regulators to get favorable regulatory decisions that may be advan-
tageous to them or to their clients, but that may be damaging to citi-
zens. An area where this has been happening with a certain frequency 
Ƥ
ơǤƤ-
counting maneuvers, which allow company managers to hide the true 
ƤǤ
Ƥ-
ƤǤ
all lead to results similar to those from explicit acts of corruption by 
public employees.
An important distinction for corruption within the public sector is that 
between grand (or political) corruption and bureaucratic (or adminis-
ȌǤƤ
ƥǤ
the manipulation of the government apparatus to achieve results that 
Ƥ ǡǡ ǡ -
Ǥơ-
cluding manipulating the passage of laws that help these leaders, their 
families, or some associates maintain their power and become rich. This 
form of “state capture” leads to questions about whether, following the 
“rule of law”, as many advocate is always a good thing. In some cases the 
ǲ ǳ  Ƥ-
 Ƥ Ǥ
of the laws may be done while maintaining some semblance of a demo-
cratic process.
Bureaucratic or administrative corruption typically receives the most 
attention by both the public and those who write on the subject per-
haps because it is the kind of corruption encountered by most citizens. 
It is the kind of “detail” or “small change” corruption prevalent in many 
countries and that is facilitated by many bureaucratic rules. Govern-
ment regulations and authorizations are often the major ingredient for 
this form of corruption. The more widespread is the use of permits and 
authorizations in a country, the more prevalent tends to become this 
kind of corruption. Public employees that engage in these acts of cor-
ruption violate the principal-agent relationship that should exist be-
tween them (the agents) and the government (the principal). These 
employees use the discretion that they have over particular decisions—
including the time required to get an answer to a request for a permit, 
CORRUPTION AND THE ECONOMYVITO TANZI 
40
and whether a request will be accepted or not—to elicit bribes that 
might occasionally be in the form of gifts or favors. This is a very com-
mon kind of corruption that, because of its frequency and the impact 
on individuals, irritates private citizens. In extreme cases it may become 
the equivalent of a “bureaucratic cholesterol” that tends to strangle eco-
ƥǯǤ
   Ƥ      
corruption, depending on whether public employees force citizens to 
pay bribes or whether the two parties spontaneously agree, say, to the 
payment of a bribe in return for a favorable decision. Of course the ini-
tiative may also start with the private citizens. This could involve tax in-
spectors and taxpayers, regulators and the regulated, or the provider of 
a public service (say in the health and the educational sectors) and the 
receiver of the service.
Other distinctions could also be introduced, as for example, that be-
tween centralized and decentralized corruption, or between corruption 
Ƥ
Ǥơ
ơǤǡ
in the remainder of the paper we will focus on the general issue of cor-
ruption, the factors that contribute to it, and the consequences of cor-
ruption for the economy.
III. Factors Contributing to Corruption
Various factors can contribute to a climate that makes corruption preva-
lent. Examining some of these factors may help in identifying measures 
or policies that could reduce corruption.
Regulations and Authorizations
Governments have several instruments for pursuing their economic ob-
jectives. Regulations and authorizations are among them. These may 
give some government employees monopoly power over some actions 
or activities, because the employees acquire the power to approve or 
disapprove requests for particular actions by citizens and by enterpris-
es. Such requests may involve getting a passport for foreign travel, get-
Ƥ
houses, to open a shop or a new enterprise, to keep shops open, to ob-
tain foreign exchange or credit from banks, and so on. When the areas 
KORUPCIJA: KORENI, MEHANIZMI, ISKORENJIVANJE
41
for which these authorizations or licenses are required are wide, as they 
are in some countries, and especially when particular public employees 
have discretion in the decisions, corruption tends to grow and econom-
ic activity tends to diminish. The more discretion public servants have 
in these decisions, and the more power they acquire and, in the absence 
of strict controls on them, the greater will be the probability that they 
will be tempted by and engage in acts of corruption.
Public employees with the power to approve or deny government per-
mits that cannot be obtained elsewhere can, in these circumstances, 
elicit payments (i.e. bribes) for speeding up the process or for providing 
positive answers to the requests. Public employees may also intention-
ǡơǡ
and may end up approving requests that should be turned down, while 
rejecting (or delaying the answer to) requests that should have been ap-
proved. It is easy to see how this kind of corruption can: increase the 
cost of engaging in business activities for particular individuals; distort 
competition; discourage new investments or activities; and even allow 
activities—such as the construction of unsafe buildings or bridges, the 
distribution of contaminated food products, or dangerous drugs—that 
can impose high costs on society.
Regulations do not need budgetary appropriations. Often they do 
not even need approval by parliaments. Thus, they are easy to intro-
duce and, once they are introduced, they acquire an often enduring or, 
at least, long life, because in most countries they do not have “sunset 
provisions.” There is no process that periodically scrutinizes them and 
eliminates regulations that are no longer needed. Regulations are rare-
ǦƤǤǡ
economic activities, just like high and random taxes (see Posner 1971 for 
ȌǤƤ
were subjected to a rigorous process of evaluation and, like the annual 
budgetary process, if the “regulatory budget” could be assessed periodi-
cally, to eliminate damaging regulations and to simplify and make those 
ƥǤǤ
Ƥ-
tention: discretion and complexity. Discretion in their application is the 
feature that directly contributes the most to corruption. The less discre-
tion is given to the public servants who supervise the regulations, the 
less corruption is likely to occur. However, discretion cannot and should 
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not be completely eliminated. When regulations are complex, they tend 
to leave much discretion to civil servants. This discretion can be used 
by the latter to favor individuals willing to pay bribes over others. The 
search for transparency in rules and regulations should be an important 
Ǥ	ǡƥ
their requests rejected should exist (a) to remove the monopoly power 
from the civil servants who make the decisions, and (b) to provide indi-
rect control over them.
Another aspect of regulations that can play a role in corruption is the 
frequency of contact between inspectors and those inspected, or be-
tween controllers and those controlled. Frequent contact fosters famil-
iarity. And familiarity tends to promote exchanges of favors and corrupt 
behavior. When, in particular activities, such as tax collection, the con-
ƥǡ
rises. The same may happen when there are revolving doors in the sense 
that at times the regulators switch to better paying jobs outside the tax 
ƤǤ
tax administrations that occasionally lose personnel from regulating 
activities, only for those employees to then use the knowledge they have 
acquired to get around regulatory obstacles or payment of taxes.
Tax Systems and Tax Incentives
ơ
of the tax system is one of the contributing factors. In some countries, 
the level of corruption in the tax administration became so high that 
at times it proved more desirable to close the existing administration 
(sending home all its employees and starting a new one with new em-
ployees) than to reform it. This happened on one occasion in Peru. The 
ingredients for corruption are: (a) complexity of the tax system; (b) ex-
cessive discretion that some tax administrators may have; (c) frequent 
ǢȋȌƥ
to accept bribes, or even to demand them. Low salaries for tax adminis-
trators also contribute to corruption.
Another problem with tax systems is that governments try to achieve 
too many objectives with them rather than concentrate on the funda-
mental objective of raising revenue in a reasonably equitable fashion. 
As a consequence, tax systems become very complex, which creates a 
framework for discretionary actions on the part of both taxpayers and 
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 Ǥ      Ƥ   -
surable tax bases gives discretionary powers to the tax inspectors, who 
deal with particular taxpayers. Close controls at times breed proximity 
and familiarity between taxpayers and tax administrators. This in turn 
ǡơ
payments. 
When countries become more developed, it becomes easier to iden-
tify tax bases, because the incomes, or the sales, originate in larger es-
tablishments (e.g., enterprises, supermarkets, banks) that keep bet-
ter accounts. It also becomes possible to collect taxes at the source, by 
withholding them, thus eliminating the physical contact between in-
Ǥƥ
Ƥ
ǤƤ-
sented by importers, import duties are calculated based on the value of 
imports determined by customs inspectors. Inspectors can close their 
ǡƤ
Ǥǡƥ-
duce the tax payment in exchange for bribes.
Because of the discretion given to those who grant them, tax incentives 
have often been a fertile ground for corruption. An enterprise that is 
granted a tax incentive may be able to reduce its tax liability by large 
Ǥǡǡƥơƥ-
cials that make certain decisions. When the tax liability, without the tax 
ǡƥǡ-
ity of corruption will rise. Thus, once again, transparency of laws and 
of decisions, and the reduction of discretion for those who make these 
decisions, can go a long way toward reducing corruption. The existence 
ơơ-
ministration may help.
Before leaving the area of public revenue, it may be worthwhile to men-
tion the corruption that is related to the appropriation, or better yet, the 
stealing of public revenue from the exports of government-owned min-
eral products (see Leite and Weidmann 2002). Often high-ranking pol-
iticians (presidents, ministers) have the power to control the earnings 
derived from the production and the export of natural resources, such 
as petroleum, diamonds, copper, tin and other valuable mineral com-
modities. When these commodities are exported, the earnings may be 
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ƥǡƥ
on quantities exported, and especially when the prices of the exports 
ƪǤ
be sold at low prices to foreign, controlled intermediaries, and then re-
ǤƤǲ-
ǳǤơǡ-
counts of political leaders or other relevant individuals. This is often 
ǲǳǤƥ
absence of a democratic process and good systems of accounting and 
accountability.
Public Spending
Ƥȋ
public spending) is very common and can take many forms. Some of 
these forms concern the activities of public servants at the low end of 
the bureaucratic scale, some concern higher levels of civil servants, 
while others involve political leaders. In all cases, the result is to in-
ǡƥǡǡ
often, reduce the growth of the economy. Corruption in public spend-
ing can range from the relatively trivial, such as the stealing of pencils 
by government employees, to grand misappropriation or great misuse 
of resources.
The “trivial” forms of corruption in public spending include public em-
ployees who: (a) receive a salary but do little work; (b) claim to be sick 
when in fact they are not; (c) appropriate some public supplies for their 
private activities; (d) spend working time on private activities, and so 
on. These actions raise the cost of running a government and reduce its 
ƥǤ
Beyond this form of trivial corruption, there are less trivial examples 
such as (a) nepotism and clientelism, which may in some cases put un-
needed or incompetent persons in particular and, at times, even sensi-
tive jobs. These individuals can cause damage to society, which extends 
well beyond the salary they receive; (b) ghost workers, who are indi-
viduals who receive a salary without ever showing up for work; or who 
may not even exist so that their wage is appropriated by someone else; 
(c) expenditure paid for services not performed or for supplies never re-
ǢȋȌǡƤ-
lar suppliers or, paying higher prices than necessary; (e) diversion of 
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ƥ
ǦƥǦǢȋȌ-
sioners, who are dead or non-existing individuals who may receive pub-
lic pensions.
Some of these forms of corruption are found in most countries, and a 
few countries experience most of them. The possibility of hiring based 
on nepotism or “clientelism” has often led to policies that limit the free-
dom of managers to hire the most needed individuals. This freedom 
     ơ  
rules (for example promotions strictly bases on seniority) that, in turn, 
reduce the possibility of introducing “value for money” performance 
criteria in public institutions and prevents the introduction of incentive 
systems for compensation or promotion.
ơ-
ministrative controls. Often the workers are only partly “ghosts” be-
cause they may show up for brief periods and disappear for much of the 
time, in order to pursue private activities during the time they should be 
Ǥơ
ƥ
for supplies or services that were never received; or that have made pay-
ơ-
tively received. These problems have been reported in many countries, 
including advanced ones.
Public sectors need to buy supplies and services for their activities. Pro-
curement operations provide a fertile ground for corruption because the 
ƪ-
ƥ
parties. Transparency international reported, for example, that after the 
“Tangentopoli” scandal, in Italy in the early 1990s, the cost of digging 
one kilometer of underground railway in Milan fell by 50 percent. These 
ƤǤ
prevent them, governments, at times, introduce detailed rules and spec-
ƤǤƤ-
cations may reduce the abuses but they tend to increase the cost of the 
Ǥ	ǤǤ͟͡Ƥ
mirror bought by the government should break when it falls. Countries 
have tried to rely on open and transparent bidding on particular gov-
ernment contracts. However, bidding and  public auctions may lead to 
CORRUPTION AND THE ECONOMYVITO TANZI 
46
collusion among bidders that may neutralize their positive impact. This 
is especially the case when participation in the bidding is restricted, for 
example by excluding foreigners. Procurement is an area that has been 
receiving considerable attention in many countries in recent years.
Public investment is an area of public spending in which corruption 
can and does play a major role. Public investments have characteris-
tics that expose them to the possibility of corruption. Each public in-
ƥǤ
Many of its characteristics must be determined at some point such as 
size, design, location, quality of the work, and so on. The company that 
will execute the project must be selected; the price and timing of the 
work must be agreed; and the possibility of revising the contracts to in-
Ƥ
must be restricted to prevent a bidder winning a contract by submitting 
a low bid and then requiring a more expensive payment at a later time. 
Ƥ
to accommodate unexpected events. Particular, high level individuals 
in the government must make some of these decisions and must ne-
gotiate the contracts. The projects must be inspected to ascertain that 
Ƥ
ƤǤ
steps may lend themselves to the payments of bribes.
Ƥ-
cant role in these choices so that money spent on public investments 
ƤǤǦ
“white elephants,” projects built at high costs that have provided little 
Ƥȋ͜͜͞͡ȌǤǡ
payment of bribes has been a determining factor in promoting these 
investments (see Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). In some cases, such as the 
building of roads or airports, the locations may have been chosen to 
 ǦǡƤ-
ures. Thus, in these cases the payment of bribes may not be part of the 
act of corruption but corruption has still played a role.
The budget cycle normally includes four stages (see Dorotinsky and 
Pradhan 2006). These are:
ȋȌ Ǥ   ƥ -
guish explicit corruption from policies that may depart from what 
ǲǤǳơ
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ơǤ
stage, when corruption occurs, it is likely to be “grand” or “political” 
ƪǲǤǳ
(b) Budget execution. It has itself several aspects such as (i) cash 
management, (ii) commitments that can be formal or informal, (iii) 
ƤǢȋȌǤ
ơǤ
(c) Budget accounting and reporting. This phase highlights the im-
Ƥǡǡ
the possibility that money allocated for education may end up being 
used for building swimming pools. This issue is important especially 
Ƥ
obtained by the central government while some of the spending is 
done by sub-national or decentralized institutions. There has been 
Ƥ
ƤǤ-
Ƥ
phenomenon promoted by institutions such as the World Bank. 
(See Tanzi 1995; de Mello and Barenstein 2002; and Shah 2006).
(d) Audits and oversight. This last phase of the budget cycle could 
be very important in preventing corruption but often it plays only a 
perfunctory function. Audits focus on legal or formal requirements, 
    ƥ   Ǥ    
ơǡ
tend to have limited if any impact on the agencies controlled.
All four of these stages can be contaminated by corruption. Thus they 
ǲƤ-
ment system” that prevents or reduces corruption. As with the revenue 
side, excessive complexity in the budgetary process, lack of transpar-
ǡƤǡ
ƤǤ
that lead to principal-agent problems. Lack of transparency reduces 
public scrutiny. Lack of full accountability reduces the incentive to per-
ƥǤ
Provision of Goods and Services at Below Market Prices
All governments provide some goods and services to the citizens at 
zero prices or at prices that are below what the market would charge. 
In some cases (educational and health services, public housing, food 
stamps) the prices charged may be zero. There is, thus, usually an ex-
cess demand for these goods and services and, as a consequence, the 
need to ration them. The task of rationing is often assigned to  particular 
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 individuals who must make the decisions as to whom and when to pro-
vide the goods and services, and how much. In these circumstances, in-
dividuals will often try to get larger quantities of goods, or faster access 
ǡƥ-
cisions. Alternatively, the latter may request some payment for favoring 
Ǥơ-
trols is evident.
ơȋȌǢȋȌǢ
(c) provision of electricity; (d) provision of water; (e) public housing; 
(f) underpriced consumption goods; (g) access to education and health 
facilities, especially surgery; (h) access to public land. Another area in 
which corruption plays a role is in situations where private individuals 
or enterprises have performed services for, or sold goods to, the gov-
ernment. For these actions they are entitled to public reimbursement. 
However, governments are often late in making these payments, be-
cause of their limited cash budget. Attempts to be put in the front of the 
   ơƥ
ǢƥǤ
In some countries this is a common situation.
Policies that control the rents for privately owned houses or buildings 
are a special type of this category of problems. In this case, the provid-
ers of the services (the houses that are rented) are private individuals; 
and the users of these services are also private individuals. Rent control 
policies create a special category of private sector corruption when those 
who have come into the legal use of rent-controlled apartments or hous-
es are able to sublet them to others at high rents as it often happens. It 
has been said that there are two ways to destroy cities: either by bomb-
ing them or by subjecting them to rent controls. This may not be much 
of an exaggeration as, inevitably, policies of rent control lead to urban 
decay, because the private owners of the buildings have no incentives to 
ǤƤǡ
because they tend to have a random impact on income distribution.
Other Discretionary Decisions
ƥǡ
Ƥǡ-
 ơǡ-
tion. There are many such areas in addition to those already mentioned. 
KORUPCIJA: KORENI, MEHANIZMI, ISKORENJIVANJE
49
ȋȌƥǡ
Ǥƥ-
termine whether a particular piece of land can be put to low value uses, 
such as agriculture, or can be used for housing or even for high-rise 
ǤƤ-
ket value of a piece of land; (b) decisions that authorize particular in-
vestments by foreign companies; c) decisions on the sale of public as-
sets; (d) decisions that grant monopoly power for particular activities 
(such as importing medicines) to some individuals; (e) decisions that 
Ƥ-
gal violations; (f) decisions as to which bank will receive funds as depos-
it held by public pension funds, public enterprises, ministries, or other 
public institutions. There is a lot of evidence that indicates that govern-
ments often let large deposits sit in accounts in private banks that do 
ǤƤ-
stitutions that hold these funds. In many of these cases the value of the 
decisions to the private agents can be very large, while the decisions are 
ƥǡǡ
be more exposed to the temptation of bribes.
Other Factors
ƪ
acts of corruption, there are other factors that can contribute to cor-
 Ǥ  ƥ  
of these factors, but there is little doubt that they can be important in 
some countries. The following deserve to be mentioned.
Social status and traditions of public employees: When honesty and 
pride in belonging to a cadre of dedicated civil servants characterizes 
public service, and when public employees command a high status in 
society and decent salaries, corruption may be contained. This is espe-
cially the case when rules regarding hiring and promotions are consid-
ered fair, so that the employees have been hired because of their abil-
ity and merit. However, when clientelism and nepotism prevail, and 
   ƥ    ǡ  Ȁ 
background, becomes an important consideration in hiring and pro-
motions, this will lead to dissatisfaction that will in turn lower the mo-
rale and the ethical standards that should guide public servants. These 
factors were stressed a long time ago by Max Weber (1947), the famous 
German sociologist.
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Another factor mentioned in the literature, and that undoubtedly plays 
  ƪǡ  
wages that they receive compared with that received in the private sec-
tor. Over many years there has been a lowering of the wages received 
by public employees, compared to those in the private sector. Populism 
has often forced governments to increase hiring in the public sector, 
while reducing the real wages of those hired. In some countries public 
ƥ-
ployees and their families to maintain a decorous life, consistent with 
ƥǤǡ-
sure, on at least some public employees, to begin to do favors for citi-
ơǤ
course once some employees follow this path, others are tempted to do 
the same. There are indications that public salaries tend to be high in 
countries where the perception of corruption is low. Some empirical ev-
idence has connected corruption to the level of public wages (see, for 
example, Van Rijekeghem and Weder 2002).
Another factor that has also attracted considerable attention in the lit-
erature on corruption is the penalty that is imposed on those caught 
in acts of corruption. There has been a tendency in this literature to 
apply to corruption theories developed by Gary Becker (Becker 1968), 
for criminal activities, and by Allingham and Sandmo (Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972), for tax evasion. The two theories, though applied to dif-
ǡǤǦơ-
tween the probability of being caught, in an illegal or criminal activity, 
and the penalty that would be imposed in such an event. The theories 
argue that an increase in the probability of getting caught, or an in-
crease in the penalty imposed, once one has been caught, will make in-
dividuals less disposed to engage in illicit acts. A drop in the probability 
of getting caught or in the severity of the penalty will have the opposite 
ơǤǡǡ-
Ƥǡ
on these two variables.
Some economists have added interesting policy guidelines to this theo-
retical analysis. It has been argued that raising the probability of catch-
Ƥ-
es, because more policemen, comptrollers, or inspectors are needed. 
Therefore, it might be cheaper to reduce administrative controls while 
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compensating for this reduction by increasing the severity of the pen-
alties. The assumption is that penalties can be increased without cost.
There are problems with the above analysis. First, it assumes moral neu-
trality. However, most (though not all) individuals favor moral behavior 
and many would not commit illicit acts, even when the probability of 
being caught is low. Second, it is not true that there are no costs associ-
ated with higher penalties. Jails, or trials are costly and they are associat-
ed with higher penalties. Third, when penalties become high, they tend 
not to be applied. One reason is that if some people are caught while 
many others who are committing the same illicit acts are not, the im-
position of penalties introduces a major problem of horizontal inequity 
among individuals. People committing the same crimes are treated dif-
ferently. For this reason harsh penalties often tend not to be applied by 
judges. Fourth, in some undemocratic societies, when the application 
of harsh penalties is possible, the penalty may be applied selectively, to 
political opponents. Thus, the penalties may become tools for repres-
sive governments. Finally, in a society in which corruption is not a rare 
occurrence, those who must apply the penalties may themselves be cor-
rupt. For example, surveys made by the Gallup Organization for Trans-
parency International indicate that “judicial systems” tend to be among 
the most corrupt institutions. Thus, those who will apply the penalties, 
may be bribed by those that ought to be punished, especially when the 
ƤǤ
conclusion that, whenever possible, preventing illicit activities through 
better controls is always a better policy than relying on harsh penalties.
IV. Some Economic Consequences of Corruption
Market economies derive their legitimacy from the belief that the in-
comes that individuals receive depend broadly on what they contribute 
to a country’s economy. Large incomes are supposed to be correspond to 
large contributions to the economy. There are several reasons why this 
may not occur. The correlation between contributions to the economy 
and the incomes received may break down because of monopolies, un-
earned rents, earnings from crimes, and so on. Corruption may be one 
of these reasons. Corruption may provide some well-placed individuals 
with undeserved incomes. Thus, where corruption is predominant, it 
raises fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the existing eco-
nomic system. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that countries 
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ƥ
have more uneven income distributions.
There are now available various indices of corruption, such as the “Cor-
ruption Perception Index,” the “Global Corruption Barometer,” the 
“Bribe Payers Survey,” and other surveys by the World Bank, the EBRD 
and other institutions. With the growing availability of indices of cor-
ruption, it can be shown that there is a negative correlation between 
the level of development of countries, measured by their per capita in-
comes, and the indices of corruption. There is also a negative correla-
tion between indices of corruption and growth rates. (See Tanzi and 
Davoodi 2001). Naturally, these correlations, per se, are not proof of 
ơǤǡǤ
However, lower corruption must make it easier for a country to grow 
and, as the country becomes richer, it might become more interested 
and more capable of dealing with corruption, because it would have the 
means to build better institutions and to institute better controls. This 
issue has attracted some attention on the part of experts, especially at 
the World Bank (see, for example, Kaufmann and Kraay, internet).
There was a time, decades ago, when some economists argued that in 
very rigid economic systems, as developing countries were assumed to 
ǡƤơ-
ơǤ
payment of bribes could help remove obstacles to investment and to 
  ǡ    Ƥ 
that had more money to pay the highest bribes, to obtain necessary au-
thorizations to make particular investments, or to undertake particular 
activities. The payment of bribes could also help speed up procedures 
or decisions to obtain needed authorizations or permits. Furthermore, 
bribes might operate as supplements to salaries thus keeping the wages 
of public servants, as well as taxes, low. This benign view of corruption, 
in which it is almost a growth factor is now largely discredited. Better 
ǡǡơ-
tion have convinced most scholars that its impact on economic devel-
opment is unquestionably negative. Many arguments have led to this 
conclusion. We shall mention only some of them.
Most students of corruption are now convinced that in many societies 
the existing rigidities, the ones that corruption is supposed to relax or 
remove, are not inevitable, or God-given. They are in fact endogenous 
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to the system. They are often created or hardened explicitly to create the 
conditions that make it possible for particular public employees to elic-
it bribes, to remove the obstacles that they have themselves created. A 
good analogy would be that of an individual who blocks a road with an 
obstacle and then imposes the payment of a fee, to remove the obsta-
cle, on those who want to use the road. These rigidities create veritable 
bureaucratic cholesterol that damages economic activities. They slow 
ƪ-
portant for economic growth. They raise the costs of transactions, delay 
the taking of economic decisions, distort competitive markets, and gen-
ƥǤƥ
arbitrary or random taxes on economic activities.
Ƥơ-
Ƥǡǡ
are often the ones that provide dynamism and create employment for 
a country’s economy. Small and new enterprises often lack the political 
connections and the political capital that protect the largest enterprises 
from the extortions that unscrupulous public employees often exert on 
economic agents. There are various surveys by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development that indicate that 
in the countries surveyed the share of an enterprise’s revenue that goes 
to the payment of bribes falls with the increase in the size of the en-
terprise. Large enterprises often have strong political connections and 
power that not only protects them from bureaucratic corruption but 
also allows them to extract rents through favorable regulations, sub-
sidized credits, trade protection, tax incentives, and other measures. 
ƥǤǡ
corruption operates like a tax that is regressive with respect to the size 
of the enterprise. When the tax is not only high and regressive but also 
random and capricious, the economic damage can be especially high.
A second way in which corruption may reduce economic growth is 
through the misallocation of talent (see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vish-
ny 1991; and Baumol 1990). In most societies there are few individuals 
who have the talent to excel in almost any activity they undertake. Al-
ƤȄ-
speare; Pelé or Maradona could not be Tiger Woods—often talented 
  ơƤǤ
ƤƤǤ-
ciety the exploitation of political connections to get economic rents is 
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the  activity that generates the highest return for a person’s talent, that 
Ƥ
a country such as managing enterprises, making valuable discoveries 
and so on. There is empirical evidence that in these circumstances there 
will be fewer engineers and more lawyers, because the latter’s skills are 
more useful for individuals who operate in these societies (see Tanzi 
and Davoodi 2001). In conclusion, the misallocation of talent toward 
ǦơǤ
A third way in which corruption can have a negative impact on econom-
ơǤ
Economic theory generally agrees that, ceteris paribus, higher invest-
ment leads to higher economic growth, at least over a long though not 
ƤǡǤ-
cal evidence. Thus, a reduction in the investment rate should lead to a 
reduction in the rate of growth.
A study by Mauro (Mauro 1995) has shown that (a) corruption leads 
to a reduction in the investment rate; and (b) that the fall in invest-
ment leads to a fall in the rate of growth of countries. Over time, a lower 
Ƥ-
try’s population. A study by Wei (Wei 1997a) has shown that corruption 
leads to a reduction in the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
GDP. Corruption tends to scare away foreign investors. Since FDI is im-
portant not only for the capital that it brings into a country but also for 
the new technologies that accompany it, it is evident that a reduction 
in FDI can reduce the growth rate. In another paper, Wei (Wei 1997b) 
had shown that the predictability of corruption is also important. Given 
the rate of corruption in a country, the more predictable corruption is 
(i.e. the more centralized it is), the lower its negative impact on growth. 
Thus, centralized corruption operates like a general tax that can be an-
ticipated, while decentralized corruption operates more like a random 
tax that is less easy to anticipate.
Some studies have shown that corruption increases public investment 
ƥ ȋ
ͥͥͤ͝ȌǤƥ
Ƥ-
Ǥƥ-
mal project designs will be chosen to carry out the investment. At the 
same time, expenditures for operation and maintenance (O&M) that 
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are  necessary to maintain the country’s infrastructure in good working 
conditions will be reduced. There is less money available and there are 
fewer opportunities for bribes in O&M expenditure. In conclusion, new 
Ƥ-
ture will be allowed to deteriorate.
        ơ Ǥ
ƪǤơ
public expenditure. It also distorts the tax system. Econometric work by 
Mauro (Mauro 1998) and by Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) shows that cor-
ruption reduces public expenditure on education and health. Thus, it 
reduces the formation of human capital that is also important for eco-
Ǥȋ͜͜͞͝ȌƤơ
those on the level and the composition of the tax system. Corruption re-
duces the tax level, decreases the productivity of value added taxes and 
reduces the contribution of income taxes to tax revenue. Other authors 
have shown the impact of corruption on borrowing costs; on the safe-
ty of property rights; on the distribution of income, and on other vari-
Ǥơ
economic development in a negative manner.
V. Attempts to Reduce Corruption
The attention that has been directed toward the problems created by 
corruption has naturally led to attempts to reduce the scope of this 
problem. It is not possible to fully survey these attempts. They have 
ranged from international initiatives to promote integrity and ethics in 
ǡƤ
phenomenon.
     Ƥ -
ǤƤƤ-
tional sphere, so that multinational enterprises would face the same 
consequences, at least in theory, for engaging in acts of corruption. This 
Ƥ
bribes not to be disadvantaged in their competitiveness. There was a time 
when American managers of enterprises could go to jail for paying bribes 
ƥǡ-
es of some other countries would not only not be punished for similar 
acts but their enterprises could treat the bribes paid as business expens-
es that were deductible for tax purposes. International conventions and 
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 agreements have attempted to eliminate these anomalies. The second 
objective has been that of raising the sensitivity of those who operate in 
the international arenas to the problems that are caused by corruption. 
Attempts have been made to create “islands of integrity” by having cor-
porations join virtual clubs, of enterprises that make commitments not 
ǤơǤ
Perhaps the initiatives at the country level are more interesting. A few 
examples will be mentioned.
Corruption has been a big issue in China for which the score on the 
corruption perception index (CPI), estimated by Transparency Inter-
national, has been low. China’s leaders have been making strong pro-
nouncements against corruption and have been taking at times drastic 
punitive steps, including capital punishment, for some of those who get 
caught. So far these steps have had some positive, however marginal, 
results, perhaps because the opportunities for, and the potential gains 
from, corruption have remained very high. The chance of being caught 
must also have remained relatively small. The perception among ob-
servers persists to be that the penalties may, at times, be imposed for 
political purposes, to get rid of particular individuals. To continue to 
sustain its high growth rate, China will need to do better on the ques-
tion of corruption. The leadership seems to have become aware of this.
Singapore is an interesting case because, within a little more than a gen-
eration, it has gone from being a normal, developing country, where 
corruption was common, to a country with one of the best scores on the 
CPI. This dramatic improvement was the result of several factors: (a) the 
example provided by the leadership; (b) the transparency of the rules 
and regulations that direct economic activities and that has made Sin-
gapore one of the most competitive places in the world; (c) the high sal-
ƥ
“rate of temptation;” (d) the zero tolerance for acts of corruption; and 
(e) the existence of a powerful and politically independent anti-corrup-
tion commission that investigates any signal of possible corruption and 
that has the power to take corrective measures, without regard to the 
political consequences and without the need for political authorization.
The role of a powerful and politically independent anti-corruption com-
mission seems to have been very important in sharply reducing corrup-
tion in Hong Kong as well. The contrast between Hong Kong and China 
is striking. While the CPI in China is very low, that in Hong Kong is high.
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Placing it among the countries with relatively low corruption. The com-
mission is given an ample budget and has wide and politically-free sup-
port and powers. The clarity of the rules and the limited role of the 
government are also factors that have helped to achieve its present po-
sition. It was not always a relatively corruption-free economy.
Perhaps the last example worth mentioning is that of Chile, a coun-
try that in recent years it has had the best CPI score among developing 
ǤƤ-
nition of the role of the state in the economy, with the transparency of 
its rules and laws, and with the attempt over the years of keeping poli-
tics as far out of economic decisions as possible.
For example, the tax administration of Chile has a high degree of politi-
cal independence. Politics of course determines the tax laws. But these 
laws are not changed frequently and the tax authority administers them 
in a politically free environment. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has surveyed various issues related to the role of corruption 
in the economic activities of countries. Corruption also plays a role in 
political activities. The “Global Corruption Barometer” made available 
by Transparency International, has listed “political parties” and “parlia-
ȀǳǤ
This paper has focused on the economic and not on the political impact 
of corruption. Corruption delegitimizes the working of a market econ-
omy, as well as the outcomes of political processes.
This paper has highlighted ways in which corruption, by distorting eco-
nomic decisions and the working of the market economy, inevitably re-
duces a country’s rate of growth. The paper has also discussed some of 
the channels through which corruption distorts various economic de-
cisions. Finally, the paper has reported on some actions that have been 
taken by countries in their attempt to reduce corruption, stressing that 
Ƥ
undertaken on many fronts.
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Apstrakt
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æǤǡ
«©¯
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āǷ«ǲǡ©
na mnogim frontovima. 
Ključne reči ekonomija, korupcija, ekonomski razvoj, javne politike, bi-
rokratija
